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THE ANTEBELLUM POLITICAL 





Constitutions are not ciphers, and their past does not provide modern-day 
explorers with treasure maps.  Those who frame them may wish, or foresee, or 
even fear certain results; but, because they frame constitutional provisions in 
general language, they cannot dictate results.  Intentions are subjective, 
uncertain, and often contradictory.  Different actors may foresee different 
results and many times the text that is enacted represents a deliberate choice to 
avoid troublesome questions of interpretation.  Constitutions, and 
constitutional amendments, are not artifacts of the past to be deciphered; they 
are present law to be applied.  They may have been intended; but in the 
present, they mean. 
In discussing the viability of a progressive American constitutionalism, no 
question of meaning is more important than that of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Alfred North Whitehead famously remarked that all of Western 
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philosophy is essentially a series of footnotes to Plato.1  Likewise, much of 
American constitutional law, at least that part of it that concerns individual 
rights, consists of a series of footnotes to the Fourteenth Amendment.2 
Consider only a small subset of the Fourteenth Amendment’s constitutional 
consequences.  The Citizenship Clause3 guarantees that the descendants of 
slaves are citizens by birth; it also bestows citizenship on the children of 
immigrants, even if the parents are barred from acquiring naturalized 
citizenship,4 or indeed have entered the country illegally.5  The Privileges and 
Immunities Clause6 protects a citizen’s right to migrate from one state to 
another without thereby sacrificing the right to vote or to qualify for public 
benefit programs.7  The Due Process Clause8 requires the states to abide by 
most of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights,9 which had previously been held to 
apply only to the federal government.10  For this reason, state legislatures may 
not outlaw speech criticizing public officials,11 jail those who question current 
economic and political arrangements,12 forbid dissidents to meet or speak in 
public,13 or outlaw the house-to-house dissemination of political or religious 
pamphlets.14  The Due Process Clause also prevents state police from 
conducting warrantless searches of homes or vehicles except under exceptional 
circumstances,15 from employing coercion or torture to obtain criminal 
confessions,16 and from holding criminal suspects incommunicado.17  State courts 
 
 1. ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY 39 (David Ray Griffin & Donald W. 
Sherburne, eds., cor. ed. 1969). 
 2. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO 
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 1 (1988); see also MICHAEL KENT  CURTIS, “NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE”: THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986); EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE 
CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869 (1990); and see 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: 
TRANSFORMATIONS (1998), and  AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION (1998) (treating the Fourteenth Amendment and its framing as part of a more 
general discussion of constitutional theory).  A classic exposition of the prehistory of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is found in JACOBUS TEN BROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (Collier Books 1965) (1951). 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1. 
 4. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-45 (1948). 
 5. Acosta v. Gaffney, 588 F.2d 1153, 1157 (3d Cir. 1977). 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2. 
 7. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504-06 (1999). 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1, cl. 2. 
 9. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 
(1994); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323-28 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 
784 (1969); cf. AMAR, supra note 2, 221-22 (suggesting that the Court’s tendency to apply individual 
clauses of the Bill of Rights to the states in their entirety is misguided). 
 10. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833). 
 11. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 512 (1939). 
 12. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969). 
 13. Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972). 
 14. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). 
 15. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 
(1925). 
 16. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 309 (1963), overruled by Keeney v. Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992); 
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936). 
 17. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 751 (1966). 
10_EPPS_FINALFMT.DOC 11/16/2004  1:46 PM 
Summer 2004] ANTEBELLUM BACKGROUND OF 14TH AMENDMENT 177 
may not require criminal defendants to pay excessive bail18 or deny them a 
speedy trial,19 effective assistance of counsel,20 trial by jury,21 the presumption of 
innocence,22 the confrontation of adverse witnesses,23 or protection against 
compulsory self-incrimination.24  State courts may not impose upon convicted 
offenders excessive fines25 or cruel and unusual punishments.26 
Beyond these rights deriving from specific constitutional text, the Due 
Process Clause provides a range of nontextual substantive rights, such as the 
right to control the education of children,27 to buy and use contraceptives28 and 
to make an uncoerced choice about abortion.29  The Equal Protection Clause 
has been held to outlaw racial segregation in the selection of state juries30 and in 
public schools,31 to forbid states from maintaining systems of higher education 
that provide men with opportunities not open to women,32 and to bar states 
from adopting constitutional provisions that designate one group of citizens as 
unequal to all others.33  Perhaps most important for an open political system, the 
Equal Protection Clause means states may not use the legislative 
apportionment process to favor one group of voters over another or count 
citizens’ votes unequally.34 
These far-reaching effects are the results of only the first section of a five-
section Amendment, which is by far the longest ever adopted through the 
amendment process.  They do not even take into account the power bestowed 
upon Congress by Section 535 to interfere with state laws that violate the 
previous four sections.  Nor do they include the middle three sections, which 
imposed unprecedented (if obsolete) federal limitations on state voting laws, 
 
 18. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971) (“Bail is basic to our system of law  . . . , and the 
Eighth Amendment’s proscription of excessive bail has been assumed to have application to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 19. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223-24 (1967). 
 20. Gideon v. Wainwright 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963). 
 21. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
 22. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976). 
 23. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019-20 (1988). 
 24. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-47 (1972). 
 25. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1951). 
 26. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). 
 27. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925). 
 28. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-55 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 
(1965). 
 29. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1994); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 
153-55 (1973). 
 30. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879). 
 31. Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954). 
 32. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996). 
 33. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626-27 (1996). 
 34. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562-64 (1964). 
 35. U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 5 (granting Congress the power to enforce provisions of the 
Amendment by enacting “appropriate legislation”). 
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qualifications for state offices, and debt-repayment schemes.36  Section 3 also 
changes the separation of powers created by the original Constitution, 
transferring from the President to Congress the power to grant “reprieves and 
pardons for offenses against the United States”37 to officials who have engaged 
in “insurrection or rebellion” or have given “aid and comfort” to the nation’s 
enemies.38 
Clearly the changes the Fourteenth Amendment wrought in our system 
were far-reaching and profound, with implications not only for the substance 
and procedure of state government but also for the relationship between states 
and the federal government and among the branches of the national 
government itself.  Viewing the Fourteenth Amendment in its totality, it is not 
too much to say that without it, the United States would not be today what we 
call a democracy. 
But while philosophers understand that they are exploring the problems 
Plato set out in his dialogues some 2,300 years ago, American judges maintain 
an odd dual consciousness about the Fourteenth Amendment.  On the one 
hand, they admit, over and over, that the Fourteenth Amendment changed this 
or that detail of our legal system.  On the other hand, they seem unaware that 
the number of details, and the direction of the changes they represent, amount 
to something more than a series of isolated, almost idiosyncratic, results of the 
amendment process.  Even in important decisions construing the Fourteenth 
Amendment, judges often seem to regard it as a minor editing change to the 
Founders’ Constitution—to interpret it first and foremost through an 
assumption that it was not designed to change the structure and workings of the 
1787 document.  The resulting jurisprudence has a kind of somnambulistic 
quality.39 
In the first major decision interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Slaughter-House Cases,40 Justice Miller explained that it was necessary to 
interpret the Amendment extremely narrowly, because otherwise it might be 
held to have changed the Constitution: 
The argument we admit is not always the most conclusive which is drawn from the 
consequences urged against the adoption of a particular construction of an instrument.  
But when, as in the case before us, these consequences are so serious, so far-reaching 
and pervading, so great a departure from the structure and spirit of our institutions; 
when the effect is to fetter and degrade the State governments by subjecting them to 
the control of Congress, in the exercise of powers heretofore universally conceded to 
 
 36. See id. § 2 (imposing penalties in congressional representation on states denying the vote to 
“male inhabitants” who have not participated in rebellion or committed crimes); id. § 3 (barring from 
office former State and federal officials who participate in rebellion); and id. § 4 (constitutionalizing 
United States public debt and forbidding states or the federal government from repaying or assuming 
any debt incurred in support of rebellion). 
 37. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 8. 
 38. Id. amend. XIV, § 3. 
 39. Cf. Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Fourteenth Amendment’s Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 
80 (1995) (characterizing the Court’s interpretive posture as one of “peculiar[] reluctan[ce] to recognize 
[proper constitutional interpretation’s] dependence upon the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
 40. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
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them of the most ordinary and fundamental character; when in fact it radically 
changes the whole theory of the relations of the State and Federal governments to 
each other and of both these governments to the people; the argument has a force that 
is irresistible, in the absence of language which expresses such a purpose too clearly to 
admit of doubt.41 
The dismissive tone of the Slaughter-House majority reappears over and 
over in the U.S. Reports, and the current Supreme Court is committed to it.  
The tone of denial appears in City of Boerne v. Flores,42 in which the Court 
insisted that Congress lacks the power to set a broad prophylactic rule enforcing 
the congressional vision of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment 
because the language of Section 5, which appears to empower Congress, is 
limited by an unwritten requirement that congressional enforcement legislation 
be “congruen[t] and proportional[]” to the constitutional violations Congress 
seeks to remedy.43  It does not seem to occur to the Court that the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment may not have reposed the same implicit trust in the 
wisdom of federal judges that the current Justices do. 
The tone of denial appears most recently in an opinion in which Chief 
Justice Rehnquist explained that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Enforcement 
Clause44 could never be construed to allow Congress to supplement state tort 
law with a federal tort cause of action against perpetrators of gender-based 
violence: 
[T]he language and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment place certain limitations 
on the manner in which Congress may attack discriminatory conduct. These 
limitations are necessary to prevent the Fourteenth Amendment from obliterating the 
Framers’ carefully crafted balance of power between the States and the National 
Government.45 
In this article, I argue that the odd tone, and almost certainly wrong 
interpretation, of these opinions arises from an impoverished historical 
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Some arises from the reticent 
tone of the legislative debates leading up to the Amendment.46  But some also 
arises because contemporary interpreters read those legislative debates without 
a rich sense of the historical background against which the framers of the 
Fourteen Amendment saw the change they were making to the Constitution. 
The Amendment was the work of a particular group of practical politicians, 
the Republican congressional majority in the Thirty-Ninth Congress, a group 
concerned with their own political futures, the future of their party, and the 
rights and desires of their constituents, as well as the future course of American 
society. 
 
 41. Id. at 78. 
 42. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 43. Id. at 520. 
 44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (granting Congress the “power, by appropriate legislation, to 
enforce the provisions of this Article”). 
 45. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620 (2000). 
 46. NELSON, supra note 2, at 4-5. 
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The Congress that framed the Fourteenth Amendment was not a 
“Reconstruction Congress,” but one overwhelmingly shaped by the practical 
concerns of the Civil War.  The Thirty-Ninth Congress, which opened its 
deliberations in December 1865 and produced the draft amendment in April 
1866, had been elected in late 1864 as part of the same wartime election cycle 
that reelected President Abraham Lincoln.  Though the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment had reacted to specific events in the South after the 
surrender at Appomattox, their sense of the issues facing the nation was that of 
the Northern Republican leadership that fought the war. 
Specifically, the framers were operating on the assumption that the cause of 
the Civil War was neither the institution of slavery itself, nor Northern moral 
disapproval of it, but a complex political institution called the Slave Power—a 
political term that referred not only to Southern whites who owned slaves but to 
constitutional provisions and political practices that gave them disproportionate 
power in the federal government.  As antebellum free-soil and anti-slavery 
politicians saw it, the complexity of the Slave Power meant that the war’s aims 
could not be realized by merely freeing the slaves and constitutionalizing their 
freedom in the Thirteenth Amendment.  Because the chief threats of the Slave 
Power lay in its negative effect on national politics and the rights of white 
citizens outside the South, eliminating it would require far-reaching changes in 
the state-federal balance, the federal separation of powers, and the internal 
political systems of the individual Southern states. 
My thesis is this: If in 1856 an anti-slavery politician had been asked to 
propose a constitutional amendment to eliminate the dangerous influence of 
the Slave Power, that politician would likely have produced something very 
much like the Fourteenth Amendment.  Thus, I argue that we should pay close 
attention to the antebellum political arguments forged by the men who later 
framed the Fourteenth Amendment.  This Article attempts to relate the final 
Amendment to antebellum politics.  I do not wish by doing so to slight the 
influence on Northern public opinion of the Civil War itself or of the events of 
1865, but I do suggest that it is extremely useful to note that the Republican 
response to the events of 1861-1865 flowed out of prewar political thought.  In 
that complex of anti-slavery ideas, the idea of the Slave Power deserves a more 
prominent place than most legal and constitutional thinkers (though not 
necessarily most professional historians of the period) have heretofore given it.  
In fact, I suggest that we accord the theory of the Slave Power the same kind of 
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attention paid to the intellectual background of the framing of the Constitution 
itself.47 
The Slave Power background of the Amendment gives grounds to argue for 
a broad interpretation of its terms, one embracing the radicalism of some of its 
authors, rather than the minimalizing approach of the Rehnquist Court.  Justice 
Miller’s reading in the Slaughter-House Cases seems untenable; somewhat 
closer to the mark, perhaps, would be the dissent in that case by Justice Swayne, 
whose words have not yet entered the constitutional law canon: 
These amendments are a new departure, and mark an important epoch in the 
constitutional history of the country.  They trench directly upon the power of the 
States, and deeply affect those bodies.  They are, in this respect, at the opposite pole 
from the first eleven.  Fairly construed these amendments may be said to rise to the 
dignity of a new Magna Charta.48 
The Slave Power concept is not a key to the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
meaning; such keys do not exist.  I intend chiefly to suggest that the framers of 
the Fourteenth Amendment were shaped by a background of political history 
and theory quite different from the eighteenth century history and philosophy 
that informed the work of framing in 1787.  The Fourteenth Amendment does 
not incorporate all anti-slavery political thought by reference, any more than 
the Religion Clause of the First Amendment49 could be considered a semiotic 
placeholder for John Locke’s “Letter Concerning Toleration.”50  But in 
interpreting the First Amendment, Locke’s famous discussion of religious 
freedom is relevant and powerfully suggestive, just as his Second Treatise of 
 
 47. Without getting into the perennial quarrel between “originalists” and others, it should be noted 
that no substantial school of constitutional thought holds that the intent of the drafters of a 
constitutonal provision is irrelevant to the contemporary process of applying it.  There is, however, a 
theoretical dispute about the construction of constitutional intent.  Should primacy be given to the 
intent of a provision’s drafters or to those who ratified it through a process of popular assent?  H. 
Jefferson Powell argues that, when discussing the “original intent” of the Constitution of 1787, primacy 
should go to the ratifying sovereigns rather than the Framers.  H. Jefferson Powell, The Original 
Understanding of Original Intent,  98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 931 (1985).  In the particular case of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, however, the primacy of the drafters is more defensible.  Unlike the original 
Constitution, the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted by Congress over a relatively short period of 
time to deal with particular problems.  In addition, ratification of the Amendment was more or less 
explicitly demanded of the Southern states as a condition of their return to full political participation in 
the Union; the Southern states thus had no representation at the time the Amendment was framed.  See 
David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1479 
(arguing that the “Civil War Amendments” should be regarded as “something in the nature of a treaty, 
reflecting the outcome of the war”).  Thus, contrary to James Bond’s argument, the Fourteenth 
Amendment should not be construed in line with the intent of the Southern ratifiers, who did not wish 
to see racial subordination ended or the Bill of Rights “incorporated” into requirements limiting states.  
See JAMES E. BOND, NO EASY WALK TO FREEDOM: RECONSTRUCTION AND THE RATIFICATION OF 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 252 (1997) (arguing that Southern debates “prove” the Supreme 
Court has “perverted” the Amendment to “fraudulently” impose the Bill of Rights on states, weaken 
state “autonomy,” and further give “an unwarranted imprimatur to egalitarian doctrines”). 
 48. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 125 (Swayne, J., dissenting).  Thanks to Jeff 
Powell for pointing this out to me. 
 49. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall pass no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”). 
 50. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING 
TOLERATION 125 (J.W. Gough ed., Macmillan 1956) (1689). 
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Government is an important source for a rich understanding of the theory of 
American representative government.51  
In our justified solicitude to understand the intellectual world of 
Philadelphia in 1787, we have neglected that of Washington in 1865 and 1866.  
Much research and writing could be done on the subject; the present work is 
intended simply as an earnest on work yet to be written and a signpost 
suggesting to others that they light out for this undiscovered country. 
Part II.A of this Article summarizes the meaning of the term “Slave Power” 
as used by the practical politicians who built the Republican Party, brought it to 
power, and won the war against the South.  It then summarizes the changes in 
historiography since the end of the war that first obscured the term and its 
meaning and are now reviving it.  Part II.B demonstrates the ways in which anti-
slavery politicians saw the strength of the Slave Power as flowing directly from 
flaws in the original Constitution of 1787, and the ways in which the antebellum 
political system strengthened the slaveowning interests of the South both within 
Southern politics and in the counsels of the nation.  Part II.C discusses the 
original Republican program for ending Slave Power influence before Southern 
secession and shows its relevance to the political situation faced by the 
Republican members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, who would eventually pass 
the Amendment.  In the Conclusion, I argue that reading the Fourteenth 
Amendment against the political background of the Slave Power concept 
suggests that the somnambulists on the federal bench have misread the 
Amendment, both in its aim and in its scope.  
II 
ANALYSIS 
A. The “Slave Power”: Conspiracy and Historiography 
The Slave Power was a term coined by abolitionists in the 1830s, but it was 
not taken up and widely used by mainstream politicians until the 1850s.52  It had 
two related but not identical meanings.53  The first referred to a conspiracy of 
slaveholders and “dough-faced” Northern politicians (Northerners who sought 
office and influence by cultivating Southern support) to preserve and extend the 
prerogatives of slaveholders.54  The second (discussed below) referred to the 
political advantages conferred on slave states by the Constitution and the 
antebellum political system. 
 
 51. Id. at 3. 
 52. LEONARD L. RICHARDS, THE SLAVE POWER: THE FREE NORTH AND SOUTHERN 
DOMINATION, 1780-1860, at 1-2 (2000). 
 53. Id. at 21-27.  Richards provides the best summary of the political arguments that underlie the 
term “Slave Power” and the struggle against it.  
 54. It was this popular image that Walt Whitman evoked in his poem, “By Blue Ontario’s Shore,” 
as interrupting the onward march of American democracy: “Slavery—the murderous, treacherous 
conspiracy to raise it upon the ruins of all the rest.”  Walt Whitman, By Blue Ontario’s Shore, in WALT 
WHITMAN, COMPLETE POETRY AND SELECTED PROSE  468, 473 (Justin Kaplan ed., 1982). 
10_EPPS_FINALFMT.DOC 11/16/2004  1:46 PM 
Summer 2004] ANTEBELLUM BACKGROUND OF 14TH AMENDMENT 183 
In the conspiratorial sense, the Slave Power fits with other conspiracy 
theories of the antebellum era—the fears of Freemasonry and Catholicism that 
spawned the Anti-Masonic and American (or “Know-Nothing”) Parties, 
respectively, for example.  Throughout the period, and throughout history, 
Americans have shown credulity toward allegations that a secretive, alien, and 
undemocratic group or elite was conspiring to subvert the promise of American 
liberty.55  That it seems implausible today does not mean that it was not 
sincerely believed at the time.  For example, no less a figure than Abraham 
Lincoln accused Stephen A. Douglas of taking part in a conscious conspiracy to 
nationalize slavery, a conspiracy in which the other participants were Presidents 
Pierce and Buchanan and Chief Justice Taney.  In his famous “House Divided” 
speech, Lincoln suggested: 
[W]hen we see a lot of framed timbers, different portions of which we know have been 
gotten out at different times and places and by different workmen—Stephen 
[Douglas], Franklin [Pierce], Roger [Taney] and James [Buchanan], for instance—and 
when we see these timbers joined together, and see they exactly make the frame of a 
house or a mill, all the tenons and mortices exactly fitting, and all the lengths and 
proportions of the different pieces exactly adapted to their respective places, and not a 
piece too many or too few—not omitting even scaffolding—or, if a single piece be 
lacking, we can see the place in the frame exactly fitted and prepared to yet bring such 
piece in—in such a case, we find it impossible to not believe that Stephen and Franklin 
and Roger and James all understood one another from the beginning, and all worked 
upon a common plan or draft drawn up before the first lick was struck.56 
In a draft speech for the 1858 senatorial election against Douglas, Lincoln 
wrote: 
I clearly see, as I think, a powerful plot to make slavery universal and perpetual in this 
nation. . . .  The evidence was circumstantial only; but nevertheless it seemed 
inconsistent with every hypothesis, save that of the existence of such conspiracy.  I 
believe the facts can be explained to-day on no other hypothesis. 57 
He repeated the charge, in somewhat more measured language, during his 
famous debates with Douglas, saying, “[T]here was a tendency, if not a 
conspiracy among those who have engineered this slavery question for the last 
four or five years, to make slavery perpetual and universal in this nation.”58 
Lincoln, a consummate politician, would of course not have made the 
accusation if he did not think voters would respond to it.  But that does not 
necessarily mean he did not believe it himself; indeed scholars believe he did.59  
Nor was Lincoln alone: 
 
 55. See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1965) 
(providing a history of conspiratorial views). 
 56. Abraham Lincoln, House Divided Speech at Springfield, Illinois, in 1 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, 1832-1858, at 426, 431 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989) [hereinafter 
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS]. 
 57. Abraham Lincoln, Draft of a Speech, in 1 SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, supra note 56, at 487, 
488. 
 58. Abraham Lincoln, First Debate: Lincoln’s Reply, in 1 SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, supra note 
56, at 508-16. 
 59. See, e.g., RICHARDS, supra note 52, at 16; DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 208 (1995). 
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Salmon P. Chase and Joshua Giddings, in their “Appeal of the Independent 
Democrats,” also claimed that the [Kansas-Nebraska Bill] repealing the Missouri 
Compromise was “part and parcel of an atrocious plot” to extend slavery into the 
West.  The New York Times portrayed it as “part of this great scheme for extending 
and perpetuating the supremacy of the Slave Power.”  The New York Tribune viewed 
it as the “first step” in “Africanizing” the American hemisphere.  David Wilmot of 
Pennsylvania [author of the anti-slavery “Wilmot Proviso”] said it was the “precursor 
of a series of measures . . . to give the Slave oligarchy complete domination.”  
Benjamin Wade of Ohio had “no doubt” that it was “but the first of a series of 
measures having for their object the nationalization of slavery.”60 
The idea of the Slave Power is relatively unfamiliar even to most educated 
Americans, and certainly has been little discussed by legal commentators.61  But 
an educated American during the half-century after the Civil War would have 
understood the antebellum era differently—as a struggle between “free soil, 
free speech, free men” on the one hand and the aggressive Slave Power on the 
other. 
The Slave Power’s role in bringing on the war was explored in two popular 
and well-regarded histories published after Appomattox—Horace Greeley’s 
The American Conflict62 and the magisterial Constitutional and Political History 
of the United States by Herman von Holst.63  Both recognized the effect the idea 
of the Slave Power had upon Northern leaders and public opinion; beyond that, 
they both concluded that the term Slave Power had a discernible and objective 
meaning in the structure of American politics.  As Michael Les Benedict notes,64 
[Postbellum] histories  by Republican participants [in the war] stressed issues of civil 
liberty.  Slaveowners’ devotion to “state rights” was a mere subterfuge. . . .  [T]he 
heart of the slavery conflict lay in the “slave power’s” assault on civil liberty, black and 
white.  Slavery was more than a labor system exploiting slave labor; it was supported 
by a network of laws that deprived nonslaveholding southern whites of the power to 
challenge it.  Even worse, the slave power extended its oppressive hand into the North 
and the territories as well.65 
Horace Greeley’s history of the Civil War era, written during 
Reconstruction, depicts the story as an assault on civil liberty, black and white, 
by the forces of the Slave Power.66  Von Holst’s account is particularly 
suggestive because, although he had lived in the United States from 1867 to 
1872,67 he was a German national who wrote from an academic position in 
Freiburg and considered himself an outsider to American civilization.68 
 
 60. RICHARDS, supra note 52, at 13-14. 
 61. See id. at 17-18. 
 62. HORACE GREELEY, THE AMERICAN CONFLICT: A HISTORY OF THE GREAT REBELLION IN 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1860-64 (Hartford, Conn., O.D. Case & Co., 1864-66). 
 63. HERMANN VON HOLST, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES (John J. Lalor et al. trans., Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1881-92) (eight volumes). 
 64. Michael Les Benedict, A Constitutional Crisis, in WRITING THE CIVIL WAR: THE QUEST TO 
UNDERSTAND 154, 156 (James M. McPherson & William J. Cooper eds., 1998). 
 65. Id 
 66. GREELEY, supra note 62. 
 67. 1 VON HOLST, supra note 63, at viii. 
 68. Id. at vii-xi. 
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As a result of the hybrid nature of the Union, von Holst argued, two 
civilizations arose. The Southern, or “slavocratic,” civilization was from the 
beginning inclined toward obtaining its way in national affairs by bullying and 
threatening Northern politicians into bartering sectional rights for Southern 
votes.69  This pattern of bullying South and appeasing North meant “that [the 
North] was governed, not by the black slaves of the south, but by its own white 
slaves.”70  This mastery in national politics ensured that “a majority of the 
justices of the supreme court of the United States would profess the doctrines 
relative to slavery which were agreeable to the slave interest, whenever a legal 
question bearing on slavery arose.”71  Secession and war was caused by “the 
doctrine of non-coercion [of states by the federal government], the slavocratic 
interpretation of state sovereignty, and slavery.”72  Northern victory ensured the 
restoration “[o]f the Union, but not of the Union reduced to ruins under the 
constitution of 1789”—but instead, of a new nation purged of the constitutional 
influence of slavocracy.73 
If writers and readers who had actual memory of the Civil War understood 
the Slave Power concept, how is it that we today have all but lost sight of it?  
The explanation lies in the highly politicized nature of Civil War historiography.  
Having lost the trial of arms, the unrepentant South won the postbellum battle 
of ideas.74  From the early twentieth century until at least the mid-1960s, the 
general understanding of the causes of the war and the nature of 
Reconstruction was one provided almost entirely by pro-Southern historians.  
In the Southern revisionist account, the Civil War was a needless conflict, 
brought on by a tiny minority of fanatical and deluded abolitionists and by a 
“blundering generation”75 of politicians who failed to see that compromise was 
always within easy reach.76 
The image of the noble, victimized South these apologists created was 
difficult to square with the picture of the haughty, aggressive oligarchy depicted 
in the Slave Power thesis.  Revisionist historian Chauncey S. Boucher attacked 
the thesis in an influential 1921 article in which he argued that antebellum 
Southern politicians had seen themselves as divided by party and subregion.77  
As historian Leonard L. Richards points out,78 however, Boucher neglected to 
deal with the principal argument of the Slave Power proponents—the argument 
 
 69. Id. at 300. 
 70. 2 id. at 171. 
 71. 6 id. at 21. 
 72. 7 id. at 459. 
 73. Id. at 458. 
 74. David Brion Davis, Free at Last; The Enduring Legacy of the South’s Civil War Victory, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 26, 2001, §  4, p. 1. 
 75. J.G. Randall, The Blundering Generation, 27 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 3 (1940). 
 76. See, e.g., id. at 7-8 (arguing that Lincoln “stumbled” into war, and that the war was “needless” 
and “repressible”). 
 77. Chancy S. Boucher, In re that Aggressive Slaveocracy, 8 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 13 (1921). 
 78. RICHARDS, supra note 52, at 20-21. 
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that when slavery was an issue, Southern politicians tended to unite and 
command considerable support from Northern allies.79 
Even if Boucher’s argument deserves credence, Boucher’s findings are all 
but irrelevant to the political preconceptions of the Republican leaders who 
drafted the Fourteenth Amendment and steered it to ratification.  In the search 
for intent and meaning, the way in which legislators perceived the world is 
highly relevant, even if we ourselves do not fully share their perceptions.80  My 
contention is not that the Slave Power existed, but that these practical anti-
slavery politicians believed it did, and that their fear of the Slave Power, as a 
conspiracy or as a constitutional flaw, shaped the view of the world they wrote 
into the Fourteenth Amendment. 
From that point of view, the Slave Power thesis was treated with undue 
harshness by liberal historian David Brion Davis in his 1969 book, The Slave 
Power Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style,81 which strongly influenced 
subsequent historiography.  As the title suggests, Davis was strongly influenced 
by Richard Hofstadter, who pioneered the idea of a “paranoid style” as a 
distinct feature of American political discourse.82  Davis applied Hofstadter’s 
idea to antebellum political thought by analyzing books and pamphlets written 
by fringe figures such as John Smith Dye, who wrote that the Slave Power was a 
tight and secretive conspiracy that had assassinated Presidents William Henry 
Harrison, Zachary Taylor, and Abraham Lincoln, had obtained control over 
President James Buchanan by poisoning him at a political gathering, and had 
generally manipulated every major political event of the first hundred years of 
the Republic.83 
But refuting the more deranged visions of the Slave Power did not negate 
the influence the concept had exercised over many figures who were not 
marginal.  Davis too easily conflated the conspiratorial rantings of Dye with the 
altogether more sober constitutional and political analyses of Lincoln, William 
Henry Seward, and Salmon P. Chase.  As Richards notes, “[i]t was not the Dyes 
of this world . . . that made the Slave Power thesis popular[,]” but the practical 
politicians of the Free-Soil and Republican Parties.84  It is less easy to dismiss 
these men as lunatics; after all, they took over the country, won the Civil War, 
and founded the last new national party to emerge in American history.  If they 
 
 79. Id. at 20. 
 80. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 611 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“Accurate or not, however, judging by the evidence of contemporaneous or near-contemporaneous 
decisions, one must conclude that Story’s understanding was shared by American courts at the crucial 
time for present purposes: 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.”). 
 81. DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE SLAVE POWER CONSPIRACY AND THE PARANOID STYLE (1969). 
 82. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 55. 
 83. See JOHN SMITH DYE, HISTORY OF THE PLOTS AND CRIMES OF THE GREAT CONSPIRACY TO 
OVERTHROW LIBERTY IN AMERICA 36, 54, 91, 113 (New York, John Smith Dye 1866).  Though 
President Buchanan was poisoned by bad oysters, Dye contends that arsenic was ground up and added 
to the sugar at a political gathering in Washington. 
 84. RICHARDS, supra note 52, at 2. 
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took the Slave Power thesis seriously, it was not because they believed someone 
poisoned President Buchanan. 
To put it in contemporary terms, a historian writing about the twentieth cen-
tury might use comic books and episodes of The X-Files to suggest that those 
who used the term “military industrial complex,” or who believed that it de-
noted a real force in American political life, were deluded.  But if the analysis 
failed to mention that the term had been coined by President Dwight Eisen-
hower85 to denote what he considered to be a genuine phenomenon, its debunk-
ing of the term would be viewed as incomplete. 
At any rate, the conspiracy theory was not the only thread of the Slave 
Power concept.  It also functioned as a political and constitutional critique, and 
in that sense was at least as important as the conspiracy theory.  It was 
particularly important politically to Free-Soil and, later, Republican politicians 
because it offered a critique of the South and its power that did not entail a 
direct attack on slavery.  Most Republicans, Lincoln included, believed that 
only a state’s own government could abolish slavery in that state.86  Their 
political program forswore federal abolition of slavery where it existed as 
unconstitutional and undesirable.  The term “anti-slavery,” as affixed to these 
leaders, was most assuredly not a synonym for “pro-black” or even 
“abolitionist,” and the Republican Party was not simply a moderate wing of the 
abolitionist movement.87 
Republican leaders differed from abolitionists in their aims, assumptions, 
and tactics.  Abolitionists were an important force in bringing the slavery issue 
to the forefront, and they helped shape Lincoln’s response to the early setbacks 
of the Civil War.88  They reached their zenith of influence in the immediate 
postbellum period, but at no time did they control the political movement 
against slavery and the Slave Power.  That role fell to practical politicians—men 
like William Seward, John Sherman, Thaddeus Stevens, and Abraham 
Lincoln—who were far more concerned with electoral victory than moral 
purity, and who often did not feel even a token commitment to racial equality.89 
The political meaning of the “Slave Power” is now enjoying a renascence in 
American historiography.  Every major analysis of antebellum politics now 
 
 85. See Charles J.G. Griffin, New Light on Eisenhower’s Farewell Address, in EISENHOWER’S WAR 
OF WORDS 273, 277 (Martin J. Medhurst ed., 1994). 
 86. See, e.g., Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Chicago, Illinois, in 1 SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, supra 
note 56, at 442-43. 
 87. RICHARDS, supra note 52, at 2-3.  For a helpful discussion of the distinction between political 
anti-slavery and “moral anti-slavery,” see William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor 
and Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 767, 774, 783. 
 88. See generally JAMES MCPHERSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY: ABOLITIONISTS AND THE 
NEGRO IN THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION (1964) (detailing efforts by black and white 
abolitionists to influence Lincoln Administration policy). 
 89. See, e.g., Lincoln, supra note 86, at 478.  On the anti-black components of anti-slavery political 
thought, see DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE 190-91 (1978) (stating that many 
Republicans were more angry at the strength of slave states than at the wrong committed against 
slaves). 
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notes that many of its central players used the term to denote a political and 
constitutional reality.90  This reality recently received a thorough examination by 
Leonard Richards.91  As Richards notes, “[T]he notion that a slaveholding 
oligarchy ran the country—and ran it for their own advantage—had wide 
support in the years before and after the Civil War.”92  Though a few on the 
“lunatic fringe”93 embraced and helped discredit the thesis, its real authors were 
“the Free-Soil Party of the late 1840s and early 1850s and the Republican Party 
thereafter.”94  These anti-slavery politicians contended that the Constitution and 
the political party system gave slaveholders and slave states control of the 
federal government: 
[S]lavemasters had far more power than their numbers warranted.  In the sixty-two 
years between Washington’s election and the Compromise of 1850, for example, 
slaveholders controlled the presidency for fifty years, the Speaker’s chair for forty-one 
years, and the chairmanship of House Ways and Means for forty-two years.  The only 
men to be reelected president—Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, and 
Jackson—were all slaveholders.  The men who sat in the Speaker’s chair the longest—
Henry Clay, Andrew Stevenson, and Nathaniel Macon—were slaveholders.  Eighteen 
out of thirty-one Supreme Court justices were slaveholders. . . . 
 . . . . 
[W]hile Yankees had disproportionate power in the national legislature and in 
northern state houses, they seldom controlled the higher offices of the national 
government.  Slaveholders generally were in control.95 
The idea of disproportionate power, and the corollary idea that slaveholders 
were conspiring to make slavery a national institution, were “the heart and soul 
of the Slave Power thesis.”96  This thesis united the anti-slavery political 
movement, and under its aegis gathered a disparate set of political thinkers, 
agitators, and office-seekers.  Some were genuinely moved by the plight of the 
slave; others were indifferent or hostile.  But all could agree that the slave states 
and the slaveowners within those states had too much power.  Because of its 
role in uniting divergent anti-slavery views, this thesis was the primary force 
 
 90. See, e.g., DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LIBERTY AND UNION 38 (1978); DON E. 
FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC: AN ACCOUNT OF THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT’S RELATIONS TO SLAVERY (Ward M. McAfee ed., 2001); ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, 
FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 99-
102 (2d ed. 1995); WILLIAM GIENAPP, THE ORIGINS OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 1852-1856, at 357-65 
(1978); MICHAEL HOLT, THE POLITICAL CRISIS OF THE 1850S (1978) [hereinafter HOLT, POLITICAL 
CRISIS]; MICHAEL HOLT, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN WHIG PARTY: JACKSONIAN 
POLITICS AND THE ONSET OF THE CIVIL WAR (1999) [hereinafter HOLT, THE RISE AND FALL]; 
RICHARD H. SEWELL, BALLOTS FOR FREEDOM: ANTISLAVERY POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 
1837-1860 (1976); Larry Gara, Slavery and the Slave Power: A Crucial Distinction, 15 CIVIL WAR HIST. 
15, 15-18 (1969).  An early and sophisticated discussion of the legal and constitutional implications of 
the Slave Power hypothesis underlies much of PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, 
FEDERALISM AND COMITY (1981). 
 91. RICHARDS, supra note 52. 
 92. Id. at 1. 
 93. Id. at 2. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 9-10. 
 96. Id. at 4. 
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behind the anti-slavery struggle over the status of slavery in the territories97 and 
thus served as a central feature of antebellum political thought. 
It is hard to give a precise definition of the disproportionate power concept 
because each major political actor tended to give it his own definition.  But 
most agreed that the Constitution as framed in 1787 gave Southern slaveholders 
and Southern states disproportionate political power within the Union. 
The most important of these features was the famous Three-Fifths Clause, 
which gave slaveholding states representation in the House of Representatives 
for their slaves at the rate of three-fifths of the representation given to free 
citizens.98  The Clause, adopted by the Constitutional Convention from the 
“federal ratio” prescribed by the Continental Congress for assessment of direct 
taxes during the period governed by the Articles of Confederation,99 had effects 
probably unforeseen at the time of its adoption.  The additional House seats 
given to the South by the Clause were known to antebellum politicians as “slave 
seats”;100 these excess House seats also gave the South extra electoral votes, 
which tipped the balance of power toward the South in presidential elections.  
Even in the early years of the Republic, this electoral advantage proved 
decisive; had electors been assigned to states solely on the basis of free 
population, as most free-state politicians believed they should be, the famous 
Jeffersonian “revolution” of 1800 would never have occurred.  John Adams 
would have been elected to a second term, and the history of the next quarter 
century (marked by unbroken rule by Jeffersonian Presidents—Virginians and 
slaveowners all) might have been very different.101 
But the Three-Fifths Clause was not the only feature of the Constitution 
that free-state politicians criticized.  Their critique also encompassed a series of 
guarantees given to the slave states that had proved a bad bargain between the 
two sections of the country.  The federal government was obligated to provide 
positive protection for slavery under the Fugitive Slave Clause,102 which 
overrode the laws of the free states and required them to assist in the return of 
escaped slaves.  Further, though it was never invoked for this purpose, anti-
slavery writers were aware that the Domestic Violence Clause103 imposed on the 
federal government a duty to come to the aid of Southern states in case of slave 
revolts. 
The critics of slavery differed among themselves about why the Framers had 
structured the federal government that way.  The abolitionists, particularly 
 
 97. Id. at 2-4.  Richards identifies several mid-nineteenth century public figures, both Northern and 
Southern, who subscribed to the Slave Power thesis.  Though their views on slavery were divergent, 
Northern politicians won power by appealing to Northerners’ fear of an overly powerful slaveholding 
class. 
 98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
 99. For an account of the adoption of the “federal ratio,” see FEHRENBACHER, supra note 90, at 
24. 
 100. RICHARDS, supra note 52, at 42. 
 101. Id. at 42. 
 102. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. 
 103. Id. § 4. 
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those of the Garrisonian persuasion, argued that the Framers had made slavery 
a central feature of the new nation, and that the Constitution therefore was a 
“Pro-Slavery Compact,”104 a “covenant with death” and an “agreement with 
Hell.”105  But the radical Garrisonians were neither the only nor the most 
powerful critics of the Slave Power under the Constitution.  Anti-slavery 
politicians such as Lincoln, Seward, and Chase began during the 1850s to argue 
that the advantages given slavery by the Constitution were neither foreseen nor 
desired by the Framers, who had expected and wanted slavery to die out in the 
years after the adoption of the Constitution.106  In this critique, the expansion 
and growth of slavery during the first half of the nineteenth century, and the 
exploitation by the slave states of their constitutional advantages, were signs 
that the Republic had strayed from its original aims, and that the Constitution 
was being perverted and misapplied. 
The constitutional critique was not expressed, as it might be today, by a 
demand for amendments.  As Michael Vorenberg has recently shown, 
amending the Constitution was, before the Civil War, a more troublesome idea 
than it is today.107  After the framing and the adoption of the Bill of Rights by 
the first Congress, the Constitution had been changed only twice.  The country 
had little experience with the amendment process, and politicians tended to 
regard the original Constitution as a kind of holy writ not to be altered by 
lesser, post-Founding mortals.  “The deeper reason for the lack of [antebellum,  
proposed] antislavery amendments,” Vorenberg explains, “was the widespread 
belief among all Americans that the constitutional text should remain static.”108 
And yet, the disgust of the Garrisonians, and the critique of more practical 
anti-slavery politicians, were both expressions of a pervasive unease with the 
political order that had grown up under the shadow of the Framer’s 
Constitution.  Though they might disagree on the appropriate cure, many 
thinkers in the North believed something had gone badly wrong under the 
Constitution of 1787. 
B. Slavery and the Antebellum Political System 
The sense that something was profoundly wrong was strengthened by the 
slave states’ domination of the three branches of the federal government.  The 
South’s advantage, only marginal when the Constitution went into effect, grew 
during the antebellum era as the invention of the cotton gin sparked an 
explosion in the number of slaves in the lower South. 
 
 104. Wendell Phillips, The Constitution; A Pro-Slavery Compact, in THE ANTI-SLAVERY 
EXAMINER; NO. 11 (1844), reprinted in THE ANTI-SLAVERY EXAMINER; NOS. 7-14 (1970). 
 105. WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 
1760-1848, at 228 (1977). 
 106. See, e.g., Abraham Lincoln, Speech at New Haven, Connecticut, in 2 SPEECHES AND 
WRITINGS, supra note 56, at 132, 141-42. 
 107. MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM 14-15 (2001). 
 108. Id. at 15. 
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The white populations of Southern states grew slowly, while the Northern 
states exploded in white immigration.  The resulting imbalance was felt in the 
House of Representatives, in which the three-fifths rule between 1800 and 1850 
consistently endowed the slave states with between fifteen and thirty “slave 
seats.”109 As scholar William Lee Miller notes, “[B]y 1860, the seven largest 
slave states, with a free population of 3,298,000, had forty-five representatives in 
the House, while the state of New York, with a free population of 3,831,590, 
had only thirty-one.”110  The overrepresentation of the free Southern population 
in the House also translated into overrepresentation of Southern voters in the 
electoral college. 
Augmenting the South’s national influence was the brute fact that pro-
slavery politicians—with federal collaboration—had suppressed free debate and 
democratic politics in the slave states in a way that seemed to mock the 
Constitution’s promise of free speech and “a republican form of government.”111  
After the Nat Turner revolt, a determined and successful effort was made to 
suppress any criticism of slavery or talk of abolition in the Southern states.  
Those who questioned the pro-slavery orthodoxy were often silenced or even 
killed by mob violence.112  Even more disturbing to those in the free states, 
Southern postmasters, with the active support of the federal government, began 
to exclude anti-slavery publications from the mails on the grounds that these 
publications might incite a slave revolt.113  The result was that the average 
Southerner was increasingly isolated from even moderate Northern anti-slavery 
opinion by what historian Clement Eaton has called an “intellectual 
blockade.”114 
Many Northerners were offended at the idea that one section of the country 
operated under a different, less free political system.115  But beyond the symbolic 
insult to the values of the Constitution, the political conformity imposed in the 
South had direct political effects on the national government and Northern 
society—effects most anti-slavery politicians and voters found threatening to 
their political interests and perhaps to their very liberties. 
 
 109. RICHARDS, supra note 52, at 57. 
 110. WILLIAM LEE MILLER, ARGUING ABOUT SLAVERY: THE GREAT BATTLE IN THE UNITED 
STATES CONGRESS 49 (1996). 
 111. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 112. LEONARD L. RICHARDS, “GENTLEMEN OF PROPERTY AND STANDING” 14-15, 156 (1970). 
 113. See RUSSEL NYE, FETTERED FREEDOM: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE SLAVERY 
CONTROVERSY, 1830-1860, 54-69 (1949). 
 114. CLEMENT EATON, FREEDOM OF THOUGHT IN THE OLD SOUTH 331 (1940).  See generally 
NYE, supra note 113. 
 115. Professor Curtis quotes Representative Sidney Edgerton of Ohio.  On the issue of the 
suppression of speech in the South, Edgerton exclaimed,  
Gentlemen of the South, the North demands of you the observance of constitutional obliga-
tions.  She demands her citizens be protected by your laws in the enjoyment of their constitu-
tional rights.  She demands the freedom of speech and of the press, and if your peculiar insti-
tution cannot stand before them, let it go down. 
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE” 284 (2000). 
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Northerners had begun to feel uneasy about their own free speech rights 
during the famous controversy over the congressional Gag Rule.  Under this 
standing congressional rule, adopted in 1836 and finally repealed after 
prolonged bitter controversy, the  House of Representatives would not permit 
citizens to lodge petitions asking for the abolition or limitation of slavery.116  
Because the First Amendment guaranteed the right to “petition for redress of 
grievances,” the collaboration of Southern lawmakers with Northern “dough-
faces” to prohibit any discussion of these petitions seemed to many—even those 
who were not themselves abolitionists—to undermine the liberties of free 
citizens of the North.  The leader of the opposition to the ban, former President 
and current representative John Quincy Adams, for the first time formulated 
and brought to wide attention the charge that the Constitution of 1787 was 
operating to grant illicit privileges to slaveowners and slave states.117 
Beyond the gag rule, free-state citizens discerned threats to their own liberty 
in the mob violence increasingly used to silence abolitionists not only in the 
South but in the North.118  The murder in 1837 of Illinois abolitionist editor 
Elijah Lovejoy, killed by a mob as he tried to defend his printing press in Alton, 
Illinois,119 was a key event in the tightening of sectional tensions and the growth 
of the feeling that the existence of slavery threatened to destroy freedom 
throughout the country.120  Beyond this extralegal pressure on free speech, pro-
slavery forces began to put pressure on the Northern states to silence slavery’s 
critics by enacting laws proclaiming abolition propaganda as “seditious libel.”121  
Southern states also demanded that Northern governors extradite slavery 
opponents to the South, where they could be tried—and hanged—for 
undermining slavery.122  Though Northern governors sometimes denounced 
abolitionists, none actually extradited them.  Nonetheless, the very demand 
dramatized both the arrogance of the Slave Power and the threat it posed to 
Northern liberty. 
Most serious of all, of course, would be the federal government’s ban of 
anti-slavery agitation—a gross violation of even a conservative reading of the 
First Amendment.  By 1860, presidential hopeful Abraham Lincoln was 
warning audiences that his likely Democratic opponent, Douglas, had 
introduced a “sedition act” that would make anti-slavery agitation a federal 
crime.123 
 
 116. For an excellent general account of the Gag Rule debate, see MILLER, supra note 110;  see also 
LEONARD L. RICHARDS, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF CONGRESSMAN JOHN QUINCY ADAMS (1986) 
(detailing Adams’s role in the fight against the Rule). 
 117. RICHARDS, supra note 116, at 152-60. 
 118. CURTIS, supra note 115, at 227-31. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 202-04. 
 123. See Lincoln, supra note 106, at 128. 
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Once firmly in place, the South’s enforced internal unity profoundly 
affected the two-party system.  While both regions were split along party lines, 
after the rise of the intellectual blockade, party divisions tended to disappear 
when votes in Congress were important to the interests of slavery.  While 
competition between the parties was a very real phenomenon to politicians 
below the Mason-Dixon line,124 opponents of slavery experienced the South’s 
congressional delegation as a monolith with the will and the power to block any 
legislation adverse to the broadest formulation of slavery’s interests.125  This 
regional unity was greater among federal officeholders than among state and 
local politicians because members of Congress tended to live and eat together 
at regionally specific boarding houses, or “messes,” in Washington.  At these 
messes, the most ideologically attuned members of the Southern block devoted 
themselves to acting as whips to enforce regional unity.126 
A second feature of the party system augmented Southern power: the 
convention system of nominating presidential candidates.  Until 1828, 
presidential candidates were usually nominated by their party’s congressional 
caucus.  In the early federal period, Southerners were a majority of the 
Democratic-Republican caucus and could thus choose nominees who were safe 
on the slavery issue.  This advantage could have faded with the growth of free-
state populations; but beginning in 1832, candidates were nominated by 
national conventions,127 meaning any presidential candidate had to face the 
reality that nearly half of the delegates at his convention would be committed to 
a pro-slavery position.  The new convention system in the Democratic Party—
the nation’s most powerful party—required a two-thirds vote to produce a 
nominee.  As a result, Southern politicians could block the national hopes not 
only of any Democratic candidate who was anti-slavery, but even of those who 
were merely insufficiently pro-slavery.  The most notorious example of this 
power was the Democrats’ denial of renomination to former President Martin 
Van Buren in 1844.  Because Van Buren opposed the expansion of slavery in 
new federal territories, he was excluded from the Democratic ticket.128 
At about the same time, the Supreme Court gave what free-state politicians 
regarded as unmistakable evidence of its loyalty to slave states and their 
political interests.  In the 1842 case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania,129 the Court gave its 
first reading to the Fugitive Slave Clause.130  Prigg was a dispute between 
 
 124. Boucher, supra note 77, at 15. 
 125. See DAVID M. POTTER, IMPENDING CRISIS 477 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1976).  An 
exceptionally good discussion of the nature of Southern political unity on slavery issues can be found in 
WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE REINTEGRATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY: SLAVERY AND THE CIVIL 
WAR 197-98 (1994). 
 126. ROY FRANKLIN NICHOLS, THE DISRUPTION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 140-41 (1948). 
 127. 1 HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1789-1844, at 501 (Arthur M. 
Schlesinger Jr. & Fred L. Israel eds., 1972) [hereinafter HISTORY OF ELECTIONS]. 
 128. Id. at 759-72. 
 129. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).  See generally FEHRENBACHER, supra note 90, at 219-25; 
FINKELMAN, supra note 90, at 132-34. 
 130. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. 
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Pennsylvania, a free state, and Maryland, a slave state, about the conduct of a 
Maryland slaveowner who came into Pennsylvania and “recaptured” a woman 
he claimed to be a runaway slave without abiding by the decision of a 
Pennsylvania court as to her status. 
In an opinion by Justice Joseph Story, the Court unanimously held that 
slaveowners entering free states carried with them the law of their home states, 
giving them the right of “recaption” of their slaves without any need to observe 
local state law or resort to local courts.  Story wrote that the Clause in effect 
nationalized a policy favoring slaveowners and created “a positive, unqualified 
right on the part of the owner of the slave, which no state law or regulation can 
in any way qualify, regulate, control, or restrain.”131  This was true even if the 
state laws had been erected to ensure that free persons were not kidnapped and 
carried into illegal slavery.  Dictum in the opinion suggested it was true even if 
the alleged slave had been born on free soil to a fugitive-slave mother.132  In 
effect, this nationalized an all-but-absolute presumption that a black resident of 
the North was a slave to any Southern claimant. 
Story was himself anti-slavery, and parts of his opinion did not strengthen 
slavery.  He wrote, in a portion not joined by the remainder of the Court, that 
states also had no obligation to pass laws facilitating the return of fugitive 
slaves.  The Constitution had entirely federalized the issue, he wrote.  Many 
free-state politicians responded by disassociating their state courts and sheriffs 
from fugitive-slave rendition entirely.  Nonetheless, the decision was a firm 
pronouncement by the Court that the Constitution had made slavery a national 
institution and an object of special solicitude by the federal government.  It was 
Prigg that first sparked the radical, or Garrisonian, wing of the anti-slavery 
movement to break with the Constitution and declare itself in favor of 
dissolution of the Union.133 
More moderate anti-slavery politicians were simply inspired to reflect on the 
fact that slaveowners dominated the Court.  Jackson and Van Buren had 
appointed eight Justices; only one was even mildly anti-slavery.  Six owned 
slaves as they sat on the bench, and one, Peter V. Daniel of Virginia, was so 
obsessively pro-slavery that he refused, during his later years on the Court, even 
to enter any state in which slavery had been abolished.134 
Anti-slavery politicians, then, could have been forgiven for concluding that 
structural flaws in the original Constitution had allowed the South to dominate 
all three branches of the government, and most particularly the judiciary.  Using 
this dominance, the South had become increasingly aggressive in pursuing 
 
 131. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 612. 
 132. See FINKELMAN, supra note 90, at 133-34. 
 133. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 90, at 223.  For an elegant argument that Prigg represents a 
sophisticated attempt to apply natural rights theory to the law of fugitive slave recaption and thus does 
not merit the scholarly criticism it receives today, see Christopher L.M. Eisgruber, Justice Story, 
Slavery, and the Natural Law Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 273 
(1988). 
 134. RICHARDS, supra note 52, at 95-96. 
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measures designed to upset the regional balance of power and harness the 
federal government in the service of slavery interests. 
The first such measure was the annexation of Texas in 1845, which many 
historians view as the real beginning to the antebellum political struggle.135  The 
entry of Texas had the potential to upset the numerical balance between free 
states and slave states.136  But even worse, from the point of view of free-state 
politicians, was the provision of the admitting bill that granted Texas, at its sole 
option, the right to subdivide at any time into as many as five states, thereby 
granting Texas and the South as many as eight new senators at any time they 
might feel outnumbered in the federal legislature.137 
Five years after the entry of Texas into the Union, the Compromise of 1850 
produced another measure that free-state politicians and citizens saw as 
subordinating their interests to those of a pro-slavery federal establishment: the 
Fugitive Slave Law of 1850.138  This act, far more stringent than the Fugitive 
Slave Law passed by the first Congress,139 explicitly subordinated state officers 
and authority to federal mandates.  To begin with, it overrode state personal 
liberty laws, denied the authority of state courts to adjudicate the cases of black 
residents claiming to be free, and barred habeas corpus relief for alleged 
fugitive slaves resisting return.  Second, it required local law enforcement 
officials to cooperate with federal fugitive slave commissioners seeking 
assistance in returning alleged fugitive slaves to whites claiming to be their 
masters.  Finally, and most galling to free-state whites, it empowered federal 
marshals to press ordinary citizens of free states into service as slave-catchers, 
on pain of imprisonment and fine for refusal to participate.140 
Beyond their demands to silence their opponents, pro-slavery forces had 
begun to escalate the debate in other ways by the 1850s.  Although Congress 
had banned the import of slaves in 1808, slave-state spokesmen began to 
demand that slaveowners be given access to the international market again, on 
the grounds that slave property was guaranteed to them by the Constitution and 
thus, that restrictions on the slave trade, though clearly contemplated by the 
 
 135. See, e.g., HOLT, POLITICAL CRISIS, supra note 90, at 39-40 (describing the polarization of 
Northerners and Southerners on the issue of slavery expansion). 
 136. MILLER, supra note 110, at 284; see also POTTER, supra note 125, at 24.  Iowa was admitted to 
statehood in 1846 as part of a compromise intended to offset this imbalance. 
 137. J. Res. 8, 28th Cong., 5 Stat. 797 (1845).  The resolution required any states formed north of the 
Missouri Compromise line to be free states—but this problem could be avoided by simply forming the 
new states from territory in which slavery was permitted. 
 138. Fugitive Slave Law, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (1850); FEHRENBACHER, supra note 90, at 232.  See 
generally FINKELMAN, supra note 90. 
 139. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 90, at 251 (“[T]he Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 was the most 
intrusive action ever taken by the federal government on behalf of slavery.”). 
 140. On the provisions of the act, see FREEHLING, supra note 125, at 202; HOLT, POLITICAL CRISIS, 
supra note 90, at 89; HOLT, THE RISE AND FALL, supra note 90, at 554; BRUCE LEVINE, HALF SLAVE 
AND HALF FREE: THE ROOTS OF CIVIL WAR 186-87 (1992); LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: 
THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790-1860, at 248 (1961); MAYER, supra note 105, at 407; JAMES M. 
MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM 80 (1988); POTTER, supra note 125, at 131. 
10_EPPS_FINALFMT.DOC 11/16/2004  1:46 PM 
196 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 67:175 
Framers, were incompatible with the spirit of the Union.141  Alternatively, slave-
state interests pressed for the annexation of Cuba or other parts of Latin 
America as sources of new slaves for Southern plantations.  President Franklin 
Pierce, with the diplomatic help of future President James Buchanan, attempted 
to purchase Cuba, outraging anti-slavery politicians.142 
Soon after the Compromise of 1850 (and despite the solemn assurances 
given by slave-state lawmakers that the compromise marked a definitive and 
binding solution to the quarrel over slavery in the territories), Illinois senator 
Stephen A. Douglas, with the support of Southern lawmakers, reopened the 
territorial question by organizing the Kansas Territory under the principle of 
“popular sovereignty.”  The Kansas-Nebraska Act143 violated the Missouri 
Compromise of 1820, which had barred slavery from territory north of 36˚ 30’.144 
Evidence suggested that the Buchanan Administration would respect “popular 
sovereignty” only if it favored making Kansas a slave state.  Federal officials 
seemed unconcerned when the new territory was invaded by mobs of “border 
ruffians” from neighboring Missouri—pro-slavery men who threatened and 
killed free-state settlers and who, with the encouragement of former Missouri 
senator David Atchison, openly cast fraudulent votes against anti-slavery 
measures and candidates in territorial elections.145  The culmination of what 
Northerners saw as a pro-slavery reign of terror came in 1856 when pro-slavery 
vigilantes “sacked” the free-soil capital, Lawrence, driving out its elected 
officials and reducing the anti-slavery headquarters to rubble with dynamite 
and artillery.146 After the “sack of Lawrence,” an unrepresentative constitutional 
convention wrote a pro-slavery state constitution for Kansas.  The 
Administration then reneged on a clear commitment to require a vote of the 
people to approve a state constitution and instead collaborated with the slave-
state party in Kansas to impose the “Lecompton Constitution” on Kansas 
without a vote. 
Two final events in the late 1850s convinced many politicians and voters in 
the North that the slave states would not be satisfied until they had imposed the 
slave system on the North.  The first was the decision in Dred Scott v. 
Sandford,147 in which the Supreme Court held Congress had no power to exclude 
slavery from the federal territories.  Northern and Southern observers alike saw 
the decision, and the majority opinion written by Chief Justice (and former 
slaveowner) Roger B. Taney, as a complete triumph for Southern interests.  
 
 141. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 90, at 180 (“The campaign to reopen the African slave trade into 
the United States was launched in 1853-54. . . .  [T]he movement became a major subject of discussion 
at the southern commercial conventions held annually in the 1850s.”). 
 142. RICHARDS, supra note 52, at 198.  A full account of Southern schemes for expansion, some 
serious, some seriocomic, appears in JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, THE MILITANT SOUTH: 1800-1861, at 105-
19 (1956). 
 143. Kansas-Nebraska Act, 10 Stat. 277 (1854). 
 144. POTTER, supra note 125, at 160. 
 145. MCPHERSON, supra note 140, at 1447. 
 146. Id. at 149. 
 147. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
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“Southern opinion upon the subject of southern slavery . . . is now the supreme 
law of the land,” exulted the Augusta, Georgia, Constitutionalist, “and 
opposition to southern opinion upon this subject is now opposition to the 
Constitution, and morally treason against the Government.”148  Mainstream 
Northern anti-slavery journals agreed. “‘There is such a thing as THE SLAVE 
POWER,’ shrieked the Cincinnati Commercial when the decision was 
announced.  ‘It has marched over and annihilated the boundaries of the states.  
We are now one great homogeneous slaveholding community.’”149 
Republicans, with an eye on the 1860 presidential election, walked a fine 
line between criticizing the decision and advocating equal citizenship for blacks.  
Many focused their critique on the idea that the decision was “incompatible 
with State rights and destructive of personal security.”150  Many also noted that a 
pending case in New York, Lemmon v. The People,151 might give the Taney 
Court an opportunity to hold that free states were required to maintain slaves 
as property whenever slave-state owners should bring them onto free soil for 
purposes of transit, sojourn, or visitation.152  From this holding it would have 
been a short jump to a rule that the Constitution required “free” states to 
permit slaves to be held permanently by residents who acquired them under the 
laws of slave states.  Such a decision would have marked the culmination of the 
Slave Power conspiracy, the completed construction of the house whose 
“framed timbers” Abraham Lincoln discerned in the actions of Pierce, 
Buchanan, Douglas, and Taney.153 
Dred Scott was seen as a watershed at the time it was announced, but 
another event loomed at least as large in the minds of free-state voters—an 
event that could be compared in its shock value to a contemporary cataclysm 
like the assassination of President Kennedy.154  This event, which occurred on 
May 22, 1856,155 gave lasting form and credibility to Northern fears that the 
South had the will and the power to transform the American system of 
government into something unrecognizable as a republic.156 
On that date, Charles Sumner, the senior senator from Massachusetts, was 
nearly killed on the Senate floor by Representative Preston S. Brooks, a South 
Carolina representative who objected to Sumner’s intemperate criticisms of the 
South and of Brooks’s cousin, South Carolina senator Andrew P. Butler, in a 
 
 148. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 89, at 418 (quoting AUGUSTA CONSTITUTIONALIST, Mar. 15, 
1857). 
 149. William E. Gienapp, The Republican Party and the Slave Power, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON 
RACE AND SLAVERY IN AMERICA 51, 67 (Robert H. Abzug & Stephen E. Maizlish eds., 1986). 
 150. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 89, at 435 (quoting Platform of Ohio Republican Party, 1857). 
 151. 26 Barb. 277 (1857). 
 152. FINKELMAN, supra note 90, at 313. 
 153. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 154. FONER, supra note 90, at 199-200. 
 155. DAVID HERBERT DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR 290-92 
(1960). 
 156. WILLIAM E. GIENAPP, THE ORIGINS OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1852-1866, at 301-03  
(1987). 
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widely publicized speech on the Kansas-Nebraska issue.  Brooks’s premeditated 
assault, carried out with a rattan cane while the victim was pinned in his seat 
and unable to resist, was made more alarming by the widespread acclaim 
Brooks received from Southern politicians, editors, and crowds.157 
The attack by “Bully Brooks,” which occurred on the same day as the 
“sack” of Lawrence, seemed to Northerners to symbolize the intention of the 
South to behave toward the North as a master does to slaves.  “Has it come to 
this, that we must speak with bated breath in the presence of our Southern 
masters?” poet and editor William Cullen Bryant wrote.  “Are we to be 
chastised as they chastise their slaves?  Are we, too, slaves, slaves for life, a 
target for their brutal blows, when we do not comport ourselves to please 
them?”158 
The rhetoric was telling.  In the wake of these events of the late 1850s, many 
Northerners had come to believe that the South intended to make slavery 
national, and would curb or eradicate the civil liberties enjoyed in the North, 
replace republican institutions of government with an aristocracy, and reduce 
the free white population of the North to “slavery.”  As historian Michael Holt 
notes, to most Americans, “slavery” was an important concept not restricted to 
racialized chattel slavery.159  From the time of the American Revolution on, 
Americans had been taught to fear “slavery” as a state of subjection to political 
tyranny and the antithesis of self-government.  Americans had fought the 
Revolution to avoid being “slaves” of a monarch across the sea;160 now they 
were threatened with subjection by their own countrymen. 
C. Republican Ideology, “States’ Rights,” and Federal Power 
In January 1861, Ohio representative John Bingham, later one of the most 
important framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, summarized the offenses of 
the Slave Power against the Union and the people of the North: 
the repeal of laws for the protection of freedom and free labor in the Territories; the 
conquest of foreign territory for slavery; the admission into the Union of a foreign 
slave State; the rejection by this sectional party of the homestead bill; the restriction of 
the right of petition; the restoration of fugitive slaves at the national expense; the 
attempt to reward slave pirates for kidnapping Africans; the attempt to acquire Cuba, 
with her six hundred thousand slaves; the attempt to fasten upon an unwilling people a 
slave constitution [in Kansas]; the attempt to enact a sedition law, thereby restricting 
the freedom of the press and the freedom of speech, in direct violation of the 
Constitution . . . and the attempt, by extra-judicial interference[,] to take away from 
 
 157. DONALD, supra note 155, at 304-07. 
 158. MCPHERSON, supra note 140, at 150 (quoting N.Y. EVENING POST, May 23, 1856). 
 159. HOLT, POLITICAL CRISIS, supra note 90, at 190-91. 
 160. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 119 
(1967). 
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the people and their Representatives the power to legislate for freedom and free labor 
in the Territories.161 
Running through Bingham’s litany was a fear of the federal government as an 
instrument of the Slave Power, a political juggernaut that, having illegitimately 
seized control of the Republic, was attempting to use it to reduce free states to 
subjection and slavery. 
The growing concern in the North between 1850 and 1860 about Southern 
control of the federal government illuminates the complex issue of “states’ 
rights” as a feature of the sectional quarrel.  During the early federal period, 
Southern statesmen had championed “states’ rights,” beginning with Jefferson 
and Madison and progressing through John C. Calhoun.162  But by 1850, the 
South had become more confident in its hold over the federal government.  
Southerners began to address the nation in sternly nationalistic tones about 
their duties to the federal government, and the concern for states’ rights became 
a Northern, and Republican, concern.163  The Republican message was that the 
Slave Power, or the “slavocracy,” was bent on using the federal machinery to 
take over the free states and impose a slave system on them. 
In 1858, Senate candidate Abraham Lincoln used strong states’ rights 
language, warning audiences that his opponent, incumbent senator Stephen A. 
Douglas, was part of a Slave Power conspiracy to nationalize slavery through 
federal power—to force slavery, and thus, black people, into a state that wanted 
no part of either: 
[W]hat is necessary to make the institution [of slavery] national?  Not war.  There is 
no danger that the people of Kentucky will shoulder their muskets and with a young 
nigger stuck on every bayonet march into Illinois and force them upon us.  There is no 
danger of our going over there and making war upon them.  Then what is necessary 
for the nationalization of slavery?  It is simply the next Dred Scott decision.  It is 
merely for the Supreme Court to decide that no State under the Constitution can 
exclude it, just as they have already decided that under the Constitution neither 
Congress nor the Territorial Legislature can do it.  When that is decided and 
acquiesced in, the whole thing is done.164 
Lincoln was not unusual among Republicans in expressing fear for free-state 
sovereignty against the federalized Slave Power behemoth.  William E. 
Gienapp notes that Gideon Welles, a prominent Connecticut Democrat who 
became a Republican stalwart and later a member of Lincoln’s Cabinet, 
abandoned his original party out of “states’ rights conservatism” in 1856, and 
 
 161. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1840 (1860).  Bingham’s speech is quoted in Michael Kent 
Curtis, John A. Bingham and the Story of American Liberty: The Lost Cause Meets the “Lost Clause,” 
36 AKRON L. REV. 617, 641-42 (2003).  I thank Professor Curtis for sharing this article with me.  It is 
only one of his innumerable courtesies. 
 162. See generally FORREST G. MCDONALD, STATES’ RIGHTS AND THE UNION: IMPERIUM IN 
IMPERIO, 1776-1876 (2000) (detailing the development of the “states’ rights” argument). 
 163. Id. at 165-66.  McDonald argues that “everything the federal authority did” during the 1850s 
was favorable to the South and that many Southerners approved of the “constitutional views of John 
Marshall,” “while northerners were adopting a Jeffersonian and Jacksonan suspicion of the federal 
government and the Supreme Court.” 
 164. Abraham Lincoln, First Debate, Mr. Lincoln’s Reply, in 2 SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, supra 
note 56, at 508, 524. 
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proclaimed that Republicans must stand for “the rights of man, the rights of the 
state, a strict construction of the constitution, opposition to the nationality and 
extension of slavery, and to the aggressive measures and unauthorized 
assumption of powers by the federal government.”165  The Republican Party’s 
national platform in 1860 demanded that “the Federal Constitution, the Rights 
of the States, and the Union of the States, must and shall be preserved.”166  The 
platform went on to guarantee “the maintenance, inviolate, of the Rights of the 
States, and especially of the right of each State to order and control its own 
domestic institutions according to its own judgment exclusively.”167 
Obviously some of this was election rhetoric, designed to reassure border-
state voters that the anti-slavery GOP was not, as its Democratic opponents 
charged, an “abolition party,” bent on abolishing slavery by federal statute (a 
course that almost every practical politician of any party believed to be 
forbidden by the Constitution).  But it was by no means empty rhetoric.  The 
federal government, as they saw it, had become the instrument of the Slave 
Power, and was engaged in war against the free states.168  Republicans as late as 
1860 had no program for federal abolition of slavery in the states where it 
existed.  Their program was opposition to the extension of the institution into 
federal territories and to the admission of new slave states.  This opposition was 
not based solely or even primarily on zeal for the welfare of the black slave 
population, but upon concern that extension of slavery would subvert the 
republican institutions of the free states, change the nation from a republic to 
an aristocracy, and end by enslaving the whites of the North.169  This concern 
was the core of anti-slavery politics in the antebellum period, and the concept of 
the Slave Power was the embodiment of those fears. 
Lincoln is the best example of the narrow contours of political anti-slavery 
in the decade before Fort Sumter.  He repeatedly forswore any belief in or 
 
 165. GIENAPP, supra note 156, at 276 n.10 (quoting Gideon Welles, “The Repeal of the Missouri 
Compromise, Its Effect on Connecticut,” typescript essay in the Welles papers at the Connecticut 
Historical Society). 
 166. National Republican Platform, Adopted by the Chicago Convention (May 17, 1860), in 2 THE 
AMERICAN PARTY BATTLE, ELECTION CAMPAIGN PAMPHLETS, 1828-1876, at 121 (Joel H. Silbey ed., 
1999). 
 167. Id. at 122. 
 168. The most ringingly nationalistic opinion to come out of the U.S. Supreme Court after the death 
of Chief Justice Marshall was Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (1 How.) 506 
(1858), which sternly denied the power of state courts to interfere with a federal prosecution of a free-
state citizen who “aided and abetted . . . the escape of a fugitive slave” from a U.S. marshal seeking to 
return him to slavery.  Id. at 507.  Taney’s opinion is certainly correct in its holding that federal statutes 
and courts are supreme over state attempts to obstruct them.  Professor Maltz comments that Ableman, 
written three years after Dred Scott, is “one of [Taney’s] most famous and well-respected decisions.”  
MALTZ, supra note 2, at 3.  But while that is true today, some free-state politicians must surely have 
noted the irony that Taney, a faithful Jacksonian advocate of states’ rights, took a narrow view of 
Congress’s power to limit slavery in Dred Scott, but insisted on the widest possible scope for its power 
to restore fugitive slaves to their masters. 
 169. See SEWELL, supra note 90, at 294-94. 
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desire for Negro equality with whites;170 his solution to the problem of slavery 
was that slaves should be freed gradually.171  Even as late as December 1, 1862, 
one month before the final Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln was 
advocating a program of constitutional amendments that would have freed the 
last bondsmen only in 1900.172  And Lincoln and many other Republicans 
believed (at least in the antebellum and early war years) that after freedom the 
former slaves should be induced, voluntarily or otherwise, to emigrate to Africa 
or Haiti.173  Lincoln’s 1862 amendments, in fact, prescribed that all persons of 
African descent would be removed from the United States.  To the extent that 
practical anti-slavery politicians like Lincoln “opposed” slavery, it was because 
of its negative impact on the freedom of Northern whites and the political 
power of free states. 
It is in order, therefore, to ask how Lincoln and those around him expected 
to deal with the Slave Power when he won election as President in 1860.  
Lincoln and the other Republican leaders in 1860 had not expected the South to 
secede—the fire-eaters of the slave states had threatened disunion so often 
since 1820 that their rhetoric had come to be seen as a combination of 
boilerplate and bluff.174  Before the secession winter of 1861, Lincoln had 
expected to take office as a minority President.  Henry Wilson, an anti-slavery 
senator who became Grant’s vice president, later explained how Republicans 
saw their political prospects in late 1860: 
[T]houghtful Republicans realized that their victory was incomplete.  They were in a 
minority of nearly a million, they had failed to carry the House of Representatives, the 
Senate was still overwhelmingly against them, and the Supreme Court was completely 
under the domination of the Slave Power.175 
The Republican strategy had been to purify the federal government from 
the Slave Power, and then, without moving directly against slavery in the states, 
to use the power of the purified federal government to build a Republican Party 
and a democratic society like that of the North in the slave states.  Henry 
Wilson explained the program: 
Armed with the power and clothed with the patronage of the national government, he 
could successfully appeal to Southern men.  Freedom of speech and of the press would 
take the place of a long and enforced silence of tongue and pen.  Emancipationists 
would spring up among themselves.  Men, with new aspirations and higher purposes, 
would soon build on the ruins of their warring power.176 
 
 170. See, e.g.,  Abraham Lincoln, Speech on Kansas-Nebraska Act, in 1 SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, 
supra note 56, at 316. 
 171. See, e.g., Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress, in 2 SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, supra note 
56, at 307. 
 172. VORENBERG, supra note 107, at 30. 
 173. See, e.g., Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress, in 2 SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, supra note 
56, at 395. 
 174. MCPHERSON, supra note 140, at 234; DONALD, supra note 59, at 260-61. 
 175. 2 HENRY WILSON, A HISTORY OF THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SLAVE POWER IN AMERICA 
704 (8th ed. Boston, J.R. Osgood & Co. 1872-1877) (1874). 
 176. Id. 
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As free government and free speech were restored below the Mason-Dixon 
line, states would freely choose to abolish the “peculiar institution.”  As they 
did so, their own newly opened political systems would abate the danger of 
undemocratic capture of the federal government.  The events of Reconstruction 
suggest that the antebellum Republicans were overoptimistic about their ability 
to create a new, moderate Southern leadership.177 
Lincoln never had the opportunity to try his plan; but the leadership of the 
Thirty-Ninth Congress saw not only the opportunity but the necessity to do 
something very similar.  In fact, the Republican leadership found itself facing 
the political situation Lincoln had expected to face in 1861—attempting to 
govern a nation that included a significant minority of states whose political 
systems deliberately excluded Republican ideas and officials from public office 
and debate. 
Despite Union victory over the South, the Party of Union was still 
desperately weak in the restored nation.  Republicans had never commanded a 
majority of the voters.  The Party had won the 1860 election with a minority of 
the vote, had not captured Congress, and had lost ground legislatively in 1862.178  
The Party had won congressional majorities in 1864, but only because the 
Southern states did not take part in the election.  In 1864, a Republican 
President had won reelection only by leading the Party into a fusion movement 
called the “National Union Party,” and by dropping the reliably anti-slavery 
Hannibal Hamlin from the ticket in favor of Southern Democrat and former 
slaveowner Andrew Johnson.179  Even that presidential victory had been 
uncertain; until the Union victories at Mobile Bay, Atlanta, and Cedar Creek, 
Lincoln had taken his defeat as a foregone conclusion.180  Republicans in 1865 
could reasonably worry that their party could win only when the Democrats 
were divided. 
Because Andrew Johnson had been Lincoln’s running mate, however, even 
the victory in 1864 was problematic.  Johnson was a lifelong Democrat, and he 
had little in common with the Republican leadership.  They had sought to woo 
him as an ally after the assassination of Lincoln,181 but by the time Congress 
convened, they realized their efforts had failed, and many correctly suspected 
Johnson was actively working to restore the South in ways that might permit 
him to run for a full term as President in 1868 on something like the Democratic 
ticket.182  Johnson was building his own potential power base by claiming the 
 
 177. See DAN T. CARTER, WHEN THE WAR WAS OVER: THE FAILURE OF SELF-
RECONSTRUCTION IN THE SOUTH, 1865-1827, at 32-33 (1985) (laying out the persistent belief of 
Northern unionists in a sizeable unionist constituency in ante- and postbellum South). 
 178. 2 HISTORY OF ELECTIONS, supra note 127, at 1117, 1163; see also GABOR S. BORITT, WHY 
THE CIVIL WAR CAME 87 (1996). 
 179. LAWANDA COX & JOHN H. COX, POLITICS, PRINCIPLE, AND PREJUDICE, 1865-1866: 
DILEMMA OF RECONSTRUCTION AMERICA 32 (1963). 
 180. See 2 HISTORY OF ELECTIONS, supra note 127, at 1170. 
 181. See MCPHERSON, supra note 88, at 314-18. 
 182. See COX & COX, supra note 179, at 66. 
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executive power to restore the Confederate States to the Union after 
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, and by using his pardon power to 
allow the antebellum leadership to assume control of the restored states.183  
Under Johnson’s proclamations, seceded states were allowed to elect 
legislatures and members of Congress under their prewar constitutions using 
all-white, restrictive prewar voting systems.184  The results, predictably, were 
state governments that seemed reluctant to give any but grudging support to the 
outcome of the war.  And in fact, the states restored by presidential order had 
elected members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress who, if seated, would have 
permanently altered the balance of power in the federal government. 
The Thirty-Ninth Congress featured solid Republican majorities in both 
houses.  In the House, Republicans numbered one hundred forty-five to a mere 
forty-six Democrats, while the Senate had thirty-nine Republicans to only 
eleven Democrats.185  But in December 1865, to Republican leaders like House 
Speaker Schuyler Colfax, Representative Thaddeus Stevens, and Senators 
Henry Wilson and John Sherman, the nose count must have seemed somewhat 
less favorable.  The official historical totals do not include the delegations sent 
by the states readmitted by Johnson’s order; when those numbers were added, 
the partisan picture must have looked a good deal chancier.  In early 1865, the 
Southern states sent fifty-five claimants to the House of Representatives, and 
twenty putative senators.186 
Elected by all-white voters, these presumptive delegations were made up 
either of conservative Southern unionists who had opposed secession but 
otherwise resisted any change in Southern society, or of outright secessionists 
and former Confederate officials.  They included at least nine former officers in 
the Confederate Army, seven former members of the Confederate Congress, 
and three former members of Southern secession conventions.  Their natural 
leader was Alexander H. Stephens, senator-elect from Georgia, who had until a 
few months before been vice president of the Confederate States of America.187 
Had these officials, or even a significant minority of them, been added to the 
legislative mix, the partisan alignment would have looked far different.  
Consider the eventual votes on adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
passed in the Senate by thirty-three to eleven, and in the House by one hundred 
thirty-eight to thirty-six.  Had every Southern representative been seated, 
proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment would have needed forty-six votes 
to pass it in the Senate, and one hundred sixty-three votes to pass it in the 
House.  The Fourteenth Amendment itself was a compromise measure, much 
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 184. ERIC L. MCKITRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION 49-50 (1960). 
 185. For the party affiliation and biography of each member, see WILLIAM H. BARNES, HISTORY 
OF THE THIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 577-624 (New York, Harper & Brothers 
1868). 
 186. EDWARD MCPHERSON, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
DURING THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1870, at 107-09 (Da Cape Press 1972) (1871). 
 187. Id. at 107. 
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weaker than many of its proponents had hoped.  Even so, it failed to attract the 
votes of every Northern Republican and would have been unlikely to attract 
any additional votes from the South.  In effect, congressional efforts to 
influence Reconstruction would have been stymied by the addition of these 
Southern members of Congress. 
The prospect of the Slave Power’s return to its former influence in Congress 
was a subject of general discussion during the months before Congress 
assembled.  Former Confederates no less than Republicans were keenly aware 
of the potential increase in their power.  Early in 1866, any unionists uneasily 
sojourning in Richmond, the former rebel capital, could have read the following 
confident analysis in the “News from Washington” column of the Richmond 
Examiner, a newspaper that during and after the War gave voice to the views of 
the most irredentist of secessionists: 
Universal assent appears to be given to the proposition that if the States lately 
rebellious be restored to rights of representation according to the Federal basis, or to 
the basis of numbers enlarged by the enumeration of all the blacks in the next census, 
the political power of the country will pass into the hands of the South, aided, as it will 
be, by Northern alliances.  The South claims that this will be the fact, and the North 
does not dispute it.188 
Nor did there seem to be much prospect of mounting effective electoral 
challenges to the conservative Southern governments Johnson was recognizing.  
As noted above, none allowed freed slaves to vote.  In fact, the “reconstructed” 
state legislatures quickly focused on enacting laws to keep former slaves in a 
state of subordination.  Deep South states like Mississippi, Florida, South 
Carolina, and Alabama tended to adopt harsher codes than did border states,189 
but most the codes shared key common features.  Freed slaves were required to 
maintain employment, often evidenced by a written contract, to avoid arrest for 
vagrancy.  Black “vagrants” were to be auctioned off as contract laborers to 
white employers who paid their fines.190  Public whipping was the penalty for a 
wide variety of offenses by blacks, including “intrud[ing]” into public assemblies 
of whites or entering vehicles designated for whites only.191  Freed slaves were 
forbidden to own or carry firearms or knives.192  Authorities could seize children 
of freed slaves and force them into apprenticeship if a court concluded that 
their parents were unable to support them.193 
The legislatures were made up of former Confederates or conservative 
Southern unionists.  The two groups were united in their conviction that 
subordination of blacks was essential to the proper functioning of the Southern 
economy and society.  Even a firm unionist like Tennessee’s Governor, W.G. 
“Parson” Brownlow, explained that “if there is anything a loyal Tennessean 
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 189. See, e.g., THEODORE BRANTNER WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH 72 (1965). 
 190. Id. at 68. 
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hates more than a rebel, it is a nigger.”194  Many of them believed their “Black 
Codes” were forward-looking reforms because they yielded to freed slaves the 
same legal rights free blacks had possessed before secession.195  But many 
Northerners, even those of moderate opinion, viewed the Black Codes as a 
defiant means designed to produce “a condition which will be slavery in all but 
its name.”196  Immediately before the assembly of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 
national readers of the New York Tribune could read the provocative headline, 
“South Carolina Re-establishing Slavery.”197  The congressional Republicans 
acted quickly to block the Black Codes by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1866.  
But concern remained that a future pro-Johnson Congress might repeal it or 
that the federal courts might invalidate it as unconstitutional. 
The new system of labor in the former Confederacy seemed a continuation 
of slavery, this time as a social and political institution rather than as a system of 
property.  Thus, the war seemed to have done nothing to bring a free labor 
system to the South; slowly but surely, the Slave Power seemed to be 
reassembling itself. 
If the reassembly had been successful, the Slave Power would have been 
made more, not less, powerful by the war.  The ratification of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, days after the Thirty-Ninth Congress met, had rendered the 
Three-Fifths Clause a dead letter.  Beginning with the reapportionment of 1870, 
the Southern states would receive full representation for each freed slave rather 
than a mere sixty percent, a change that would give the region thirteen more 
House seats and electoral votes198 without the extension of minimal political 
rights, much less the franchise, to the freed slaves who formed the basis of the 
representation.  It would be the “slave seats” problem all over again. 
This meant that the Republicans, despite having won the war, might be 
unable to prevent a coalition of Northern and Southern Democrats from giving 
away the peace.  If the Southern members were seated, their numbers in the 
Thirty-Ninth Congress would make it all but impossible to block Johnson’s 
presidential reconstruction.  Moreover, their power in Congress would give 
them decisive influence over the Democratic presidential nomination in 1868.  
Finally, the electoral vote windfall given by nullifying the Three-Fifths Clause 
might even enable the South to swing the White House to their chosen 
nominee.  Obviously, Johnson hoped to be the beneficiary of this Southern 
powerhouse; but as early as December 1865, rumors began to flood the country, 
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North and South, that the next Democratic presidential nominee would be not 
Johnson but a popular war hero—Robert E. Lee.199 
Once safely back in control of the federal government, the former 
slavemasters could recreate some new institution resembling slavery; they could 
also use the federal treasury to pay off the debts owed by the Confederacy to 
Southern and European bondholders, or conversely to repudiate bonds issued 
by the Union to finance the war effort. 
In short, the Republicans in late 1865 needed both a short-term and a long-
term strategy to prevent the complete reascendancy of the Slave Power—
political domination of the federal government by skewed representation, one-
party rule in the South, and subordination in economic policy of the needs of 
the industrial North.  In the short term, the Republicans solved their political 
dilemma with a desperate expedient: using their control of the House Clerk’s 
Office, they simply refused to recognize any representatives from the 
presidentially reconstructed states.200  This tactical move ensured Republican 
political dominance was maintained until the next election.  But obviously a 
longer term solution was needed—a mechanism that would check the 
recrudescence of the Slave Power so that Lincoln’s original plan could go into 
effect. 
Advanced thinkers in the Party and the abolition movement favored giving 
the vote to the freed slaves.  But black suffrage had never been an important 
part of the Republican program.  It was an unpopular idea in the North, and 
only five Northern states allowed free blacks to vote in 1865.201  Republicans 
were deeply concerned about physical violence and legalized subordination of 
the freed slaves, but their commitment to black Southerners as full members of 
the political order was more equivocal.  For conservative Republicans, the 
vision was still of a white man’s country, but one that lived by open debate and 
republican values. 
The long-term fix would need to prevent conservative forces in the South 
from reimposing the “intellectual blockade” over public discussion.202  It would 
permit not only free debate but genuine political competition between the 
parties.  At the same time, it would need to prevent Southern leaders from 
 
 199. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 
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a pro-Confederate Northern “Copperhead” like Clement Vallandigham and the actual nominee of the 
party in 1864, General George McClelland. 
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using black populations (which in 1865 meant only Southern states) as a non-
voting basis for disproportionate representation; states with large black 
populations would have to choose between black suffrage and loss of 
representation.  In addition, the solution would need to proscribe the 
reascendance of disloyal conservative leaders of the Slave South, permitting a 
new leadership to emerge under federal patronage and protection.  And it 
would need to empower Congress, the only branch of the federal government 
under firm Republican control, to override both the executive and the judiciary, 
and the Southern state governments, in setting the terms of political life. 
In short, the long-term fix for the danger of a new Slave Power looks 
remarkably like the Fourteenth Amendment. 
III 
CONCLUSION 
Of course, the Slave Power was not the only political current that powered 
Republicanism during the antebellum and immediate postwar periods.  The 
ideology of “free labor,” with its economic vision of independence and integrity 
as an individual value, also powerfully affected the Republican view of the 
world.203  In addition, many of those who took part in framing the Fourteenth 
Amendment (even some known to history as radicals) were men of profoundly 
conservative instincts who, while they wished to preserve the result of the Civil 
War, wished also to preserve key features of the Republic they had known 
before the war.204  Finally, the political vagaries of 1866 shaped the specifics of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s text.  As Eric Foner notes: 
 
 203. See generally FONER, supra note 90 (summarizing the free labor view).  
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that the Slave Power would use its control over the federal government to suppress the republican 
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as it had been but as it should have been had what they considered the republican ideas of the Framers 
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remained republican, and both sides of the equation—state and federal—would retain means to defend 
themselves against capture by oligarchies such as a reconstituted Slave Power.  In an article arguing 
that the Waite Court faithfully interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment and vindicated national power, 
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Calhoun’s argument for “state sovereignty.”  See Michael Les Benedict, Preserving Federalism: 
Reconstruction and the Waite Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 39. 
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[T]he aims of the Fourteenth Amendment can only be understood within the political 
and ideological context of 1866: the break with the President, the need to find a 
measure upon which all Republicans could unite, and the growing consensus within 
the party around the need for strong federal action to protect the freedmen’s rights, 
short of the suffrage.205 
But the Slave Power thesis also played an important role in shaping an 
ideological response to the immediate needs of 1866—a response that was, in 
the Freudian sense, “over-determined,” a result of multiple forces flowing 
together.  Political actors must often react to events without adequate time to 
think; they always operate against a set of assumptions and beliefs, which are 
shaped both by the practical concerns of the moment and by the ideological 
lessons they have absorbed during their careers.  In our own time, we can see 
how Republican politicians sincerely believe that almost any policy challenge—
recession or prosperity, deficit or surplus, peace or war—is the occasion for the 
abolition of the capital-gains and estate taxes.206  Democrats tend to see any civic 
challenge—medical care, education, energy shortage, or terrorism—as requiring 
a new federal government agency.207 
It is easy for those who disagree with the underlying political philosophy 
thus expressed to conclude that this insistence must be the result of simple 
hypocrisy and bad faith.  But political life is rarely that simple.  We confront 
new problems with the tools we have learned to use, and this is true whether 
those tools are weapons or political ideas.  In the case of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the events of 1865-1866 posed a complex question.  The answer 
the Thirty-Ninth Congress constructed resembles, not coincidentally, the 
antebellum solution to the problems of the Republic: Cripple the Slave Power. 
Read against a Slave Power background, an overriding aim of the 
Fourteenth Amendment seems to have been predominantly defensive: to 
protect the federal government against former slave states, to ensure that the 
new government forged during the Civil War would be supreme in any future 
confrontation, and to require that reconstructed state governments of the South 
run their internal politics by the North’s republican rules. 
Though the Slave Power thesis has been revived by historians, it has so far 
made few inroads into legal scholars’ interpretations of the Fourteenth 
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Amendment.208  I believe this thesis and its history provide a fertile ground for 
scholars reading the congressional debates.209  A reading of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as a measure against the Slave Power would also confound certain 
assumptions of current jurisprudence.  To begin with, since the Slaughter-House 
Cases, courts and commentators have tended to take for granted that the Equal 
Protection Clause of Section 1, and perhaps all of Section 1, were aimed 
specifically at the situation of the freed slaves.210  There is ample warrant in the 
history of anti-slavery thought to cast doubt on that interpretation.  The 
Fourteenth Amendment may be better seen as a source of political values than 
of specifically legal, formal guarantees.211  In light of the Slave Power thesis, the 
Privileges and Immunities, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses can be 
seen as guaranteeing a free and open society for all Southerners, white and 
black, with free speech and free elections (perhaps all white at first, but very 
soon open to voters of both races), and as reaffirming the interpretation of the 
Guaranty Clause that anti-slavery politicians had sought to advance before the 
Civil War. 
The political background of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests that it was 
designed to operate powerfully on the internal life of the states—to impose the 
nationalist vision implied by Madison’s argument for an “extended republic,” 
impervious to the claims of “faction,” as the best guarantee of self-rule and 
liberty.212  State governments were dangerous, not only to their own people but 
to the purified democratic republic forged on the anvil of Civil War.  The 
normative preference for states as the political shapers of society that some 
claim to discern in the Constitution of 1787 would thus be negated or perhaps 
even reversed, with a new preference for national values of equality, 
participation, and open debate.  The Fourteenth Amendment thus read would 
be a fertile source of arguments over the essential components of such an open 
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society, in which political decisions are made by an informed process of critical 
discourse among free, equal citizens.213 
The Slave Power reading also casts doubt on any argument that the purpose 
of the Fourteenth Amendment was primarily to empower the federal judiciary 
and strengthen its role as arbiter of constitutional rights.214  The framers vividly 
remembered the capture of the judiciary by the Slave Power, and they feared it 
had not yet fully freed itself. 
In fact, it seems much more probable Congress intended to grant itself a co-
equal role with the courts in the clearly political work of defining what 
constitutes “privileges and immunities,” “due process of law,” and “equal 
protection of the laws.”  Congressional statutes might set the goals; the courts 
would enforce them.  Both branches might be involved, but the Court’s current 
vision of itself at the center, with Congress relegated to an occasional role as an 
auxiliary enforcer of court decisions, seems far from what Slave Power–minded 
framers intended. 
Finally, the Slave Power reading calls into question any vision of American 
federalism inspired by the structure of the 1787 Constitution.  The framers of 
the Fourteenth Amendment surely believed they were making a far-reaching 
and significant change to that original design. 
For example, one of the most startling recent opinions in the U.S. Reports is 
the five-four decision in United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,215 which 
concerned the attempt of a political majority in Colorado to disqualify 
congressional candidates from appearance on the ballot if they had served more 
than a set number of years in office.216  The majority, in an opinion by Justice 
Souter, held that such restrictions, whether imposed by state legislatures or by 
voters through initiative or referendum, violated the Qualifications Clause of 
the United States Constitution.217  The conservative minority, in a dissent by 
Justice Thomas, argued states have retained the power to designate who among 
their citizens can run for federal office.218 
Both the majority and the dissent took for granted that the terms of the 
debate are limited to discerning the intentions of the Framers of 1787 about the 
relationship between state governments and federal elections.  Each thus spent 
much time discussing the implications of various statements in The Federalist—
as if that pamphlet, written as an anonymous polemic to garner public support 
for ratification of the Constitution, constitutes not only an authoritative 
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legislative history of the Framing but a guide to the Constitution’s 
contemporary meaning. 
Nowhere in the majority or dissenting opinions does any Justice give serious 
consideration to the idea that the state-federal relationship was fundamentally 
altered by the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.  It is understandable 
that the case was not decided on the basis of the Fourteenth Amendment—the 
question does not clearly seem to implicate either “due process” or “the equal 
protection of the laws” (though a properly invigorated “privileges or 
immunities” clause might have more bearing on the right of voters to choose 
any eligible candidate for federal office).  But I do think the question implicates 
Fourteenth Amendment values; if one aim of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
to defend the national government against control by transient majorities or 
undemocratic factions in the states, the suggestion that states could eliminate 
from the ballot persons eligible for office under the Constitution would seem 
profoundly antithetical to its overall theory. 
“[W]e must never forget,” wrote Chief Justice John Marshall in 1819, “that 
it is a constitution we are expounding.”219  Similarly, we must not forget that in 
construing the Fourteenth Amendment, we are expounding an amendment, a 
change, one that is “to all intents and purposes”220 as much a part of the 
Constitution as any of the original clauses. The Fourteenth Amendment was 
drafted at the end of a terrible war that transformed almost every feature of 
American life.  It seems entirely logical to believe that the Amendment was 
intended to render permanent those changes.  The burden thus should rest on 
those who wish to argue that the Amendment did not change “the Framers’ 
carefully crafted balance of power between the States and the National 
Government”221 because the record suggests that those who drafted it saw not 
just the glory of what was written at Philadelphia but its flaws as well. 
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